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The emergence of emergentism  
in cognitive science
Alfredo Paternoster
This paper addresses, fundamentally, a single 
issue: assessing whether the currently very influ-
ent approach in cognitive sciences, i.e., Radical 
Embodied Cognitive Science (from now on, RECS), 
is committed to some version of emergentism. The 
structure of the paper is the following. In the first 
section I introduce the leading ideas of RECS. In 
the second section I compare certain standard  
formulations of emergentism with the main claims 
of RECS, trying to assess whether the latter 
involve some emergentist tenets. Some conclu-
sions, in the third section, follow. My conclusion 
will be that, on the one hand, there are some sub-
stantive epistemological analogies between RECS 
and emergentism, but, on the other hand, the meta-
physics of RECS is not of an emergentist kind,  
in spite of some shallow similarities. Therefore, 
depending on one’s taking emergentism as an 
epistemological rather than a metaphysical thesis, 
RECS will be considered as being committed to 
emergentism or not (as it happens, I take emer-
gentism in its standard formulation essentially as 
a metaphysical thesis, so my answer to the ques-
tion addressed in this paper is more negative).  
EMERGENCE EMERGENTISM 
EMBODIMENT ENACTIVISM DYNAMICISM
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I. 4E–cognition and radical embodied cognitive science 
Traditional explanations in cognitive sciences are mechanistic. There are two reasons 
for this:
1. Cognitive processes have been taken to be computations. In other words, 
the mind is described as an information processing system (which is of 
course a mechanical system). 
2. The growing influence of neuroscience leads “naturally” to biological kinds 
of explanation, which are mostly mechanistic (at least in the case of fun-
ctional biology). 
The situation, however, has being changing, and the main tenets of classi-
cal cognitive science have been put in question, at least in part. According 
to a radically alternative point of view, traditional explanations are unable 
to account for some crucial features of cognition, namely, for its embodied, 
embedded, extended and enactive character. This is the so-called 4E-view 
of cognition. Let me shortly illustrate each of these features.  
E1: Embodied
Admittedly, the concept of embodiment is ill defined, as is showed by the fact that 
several different phenomena are regarded as instances of embodiment. The clearest 
idea is that certain mental abilities are better to be conceived of as bodily skills. 
A good example of embodiment is O’Regan & Noë’s thesis according to 
which perceiving consists in carrying out sensorimotor skills, that is to say, in the 
implicit knowledge of «sensorimotor contingencies» (see e.g. O’Regan & Noë 2001). 
Mastering a sensorimotor contingency amounts to knowing how the stimulus chang-
es depending on how one moves (or, vice versa, knowing how one should move in or-
der to have a different view of the stimulus).
E2: Embedded
Embeddedness is the idea that one cannot study mental processes making abstrac-
tion of the external (i.e., environmental) context in which they take place. 
The behavior of an organism or agent is determined by the physical inter-
action with the environment, rather than by mental representations. For instance, in 
situated robotics (Mataric 2006) environmental information drives directly – with-
out further elaboration – the actions of the organism. Agents are always “in touch” 
with the environment and the relation between the agent and the environment is 
dynamical.
E3: Extended
Here the thesis is that mind can bypass the borders of body, extending itself to encom-
pass parts of the environment. More specifically, as Clark and Chalmers (1998, 8) put it:
If, in dealing with a certain task, a part of the world works as a process that we would take 
without hesitation as a part of a cognitive process if it was realized in the head, then that 
part of the world [...] is part of the cognitive process [...]. Cognitive processes are not entire-
ly in the head. 
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This is arguably the most puzzling feature of 4-E cognition. Yet, the idea that a men-
tal process does not need to be enclosed in the head in order to be mental is a quite 
natural consequence of functionalism, a cornerstone of classical cognitive science. 
Indeed, functionalism claims that mental properties need not necessarily to be re-
alized by cerebral materials. What makes a property mental is its causal role, and a 
causal role can be filled by any physical property, irrespectively of being internal rath-
er than external.
E4: Enactive
This concept is also ill defined. It can be interpreted in two different ways, a narrow 
one and a broad one. 
In the narrow interpretation enactivism is O’Regan and Noë’s already men-
tioned view of visual perception (see the point E1 above). I characterized this view as 
embodied since the practice of perceptual skills is a bodily know-how –it is the body 
that knows what to do in order to see. When one says that perception is enactive, he 
is focusing on the fact that perception is a kind of action. Against the traditional view 
according to which perceptual input is cognitively processed and this processing de-
termines the right action, here perception and action are one and same thing. For in-
stance, in order to see the hidden part of an object I have to move in a certain appro-
priate way.  
In the broad interpretation enactivism is the very general view according to 
which the entire mental life is essentially the whole of actions performed by a body 
in the environment (= E1+E2+narrow E4 +, perhaps, E3). Instead of conceiving of ac-
tion as the result of thought, the suggestion is that we think by acting in the environ-
ment. Therefore, on the broad interpretation, enactivism tends to be identical with 4E 
cognition taken as a whole. Also, it is part and parcel of broad enactivism the idea that 
the world is a sort of joint construction agent-environment. 
Now, one could in principle endorse only a subset of the 4E features. He is not 
forced to buy all of them. And it is in principle possible to have different attitudes as to 
the relation between these ideas and classical cognitive science. That is, one can reject 
classical cognitive science across the board, or, more moderately, he can support a plu-
ralistic picture in which computational models and 4E-inspired models can coexist. 
Here I am interested, however, to the most radical positions, for two rea-
sons. For one thing, assessing a stronger position is easier: there are more chances to 
arrive to some well-established conclusions. For another thing, the most radical posi-
tions are today much discussed; they are like sailboats catching the wind. 
The most influential radical positions are today: (i) Gallagher (2017)’s enac-
tivism; (ii) Hutto & Myin (2013; 2017)’s RECS (remember: Radical Embodied Cognitive 
Science), and (iii) Chemero (2009)’s RECS. A quick comparison of these three posi-
tions will show that they have undoubtedly much, yet not all, in common.  
(i) Gallagher’s enactivism
In his introduction to Enactivist Interventions (2017), Shaun Gallagher puts forward 
a list of seven main tenets of enactivism. Here I simplify a bit, re-elaborating these 
claims and reducing them to the following five: 
1. Cognition emerges from processes distributed across the brain, the body, 
and the environment (hence a mental event is not merely a brain event). 
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2. «The world (meaning, intentionality) is not pre-given or predefined, but is 
structured by cognition and action» (2017, 6). 
3. Cognitive processes acquire meaning in part by their role in the context of 
action, rather than through a representational mapping or replicated inter-
nal model of the world. 
4. Enactivist approaches have strong links to dynamical systems theory, 
emphasizing the relevance of dynamical coupling and coordination across 
the brain, the body and the environment. 
5. Higher-order cognitive functions, such as reflective thinking or deliberation, 
are exercises of skillful know-how and are usually coupled with situated 
and embodied actions. 
(ii) Hutto & Myin’s RECS
According to Hutto & Myin (2013), RECS is the conjunction of the two following 
theses: 
1. Cognition is something an agent does (pragmatist view of cognition)
2. Cognition is realized by dynamic, cyclic and extended processes, i.e., by sen-
sorimotor loops (dynamicist view of cognition)
(iii) Chemero’s RECS
According to Chemero (2009), RECS is the conjunction of the following theses: 
1. Mind is not representational
2. Mind is not computational (= mental processes are neither computational 
nor representational)
3. Cognitive abilities are best modeled by non-linear dynamical systems 
(“dynamicism”)
As the reader can easily realize, there is substantive agreement between Hutto & Myin 
and Chemero. Indeed, Hutto & Myin’s thesis 2 is identical to Chemero’s thesis 3; and 
Hutto & Myin’s thesis 1 entails Chemero’s theses 1 and 2. Therefore we will talk from 
now on simply of RECS, without further specification (as we shall see, there is much 
useful in Chemero’s book for the comparison with emergentism). 
There is also substantive agreement between RECS and Gallagher’s enactiv-
ism. Gallagher is more specific on some points. 1 RECS 
is certainly committed to embodiment, embeddedness 
and to most (at least) theses of Gallagher’s enactivism. 
The attitude as regard to extended mind is much more 
cautious, in spite of some analogies with embeddedness. 
II. Is RECS (or enactivism) an emergentist view?
Now we are ready to discuss the central issue of this paper: Is RECS alias Enactivism 
an emergentist view? One could legitimately ask why posing this question. After all, 
the notion of emergence occurs only in the first claim of Gallagher’s list, and the use 
of the word ‘emerge’ in that claim seems to be non-technical, not specifically refer-
ring to some metaphysical or epistemological view. Hence, why thinking that there 
1 Note that in Chemero’s version 
negative theses have a prominent 
role. 
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could be a relation between RECS and emergentism at all? 
The answer is: dynamicism. As we saw above, references to dynamical sys-
tems theory or to dynamicism in general are present in all the positions introduced 
in the first section; and dynamicism, as we shall see shortly, has clearly much to do 
with some aspects of emergentism. Therefore, there is room to search for a relation 
between RECS and emergentism, even if there is a major difficulty in this comparison: 
emergentism is a metaphysical thesis or, at least, a metaphysical thesis is a necessary 
component of the emergentist view, whereas RECS is in the first instance an episte-
mological thesis, a thesis concerning how the mind should be studied –and compar-
ing epistemological claims with metaphysical claims is arguably a typical philosoph-
ical error. 
This difficulty is not an insurmountable obstacle, however, because it is pos-
sible to extrapolate from RECS a metaphysical view, though there could be some dis-
agreement on what is RECS’ metaphysical view. I will proceed, therefore, in the fol-
lowing way. First of all, I shall take into consideration an epistemological version of 
emergentism (I will consider emergentism as an epistemological thesis) and com-
pare it with RECS (taken, I repeat, as an essentially epistemological claim too). Then I 
will take, so to speak, the opposite path: I shall compare the metaphysical theses that 
can be reasonably drawn from RECS with the standard metaphysical formulations of 
emergentism. Finally, I shall crosscheck the results of the two comparisons and try to 
sketch a single, comprehensive answer to our main question. There is a point, in par-
ticular, in which we have to be especially careful: there are two ways of deriving from 
RECS a metaphysical thesis. Either we can read dynamicism as a metaphysical thesis 
(this amounts to deriving from RECS’ explanatory model a corresponding metaphys-
ical view of the mind); or we can take into consideration the explicit metaphysical 
claims made by RECS’ supporters. We will explore both the ways and verify whether 
they lead us to the same place. 
Let us start by giving a simple and usual definition of emergentism.
E1) High level properties, e.g. mental properties, are really novel and endowed 
of causal powers. 
‘Novel’ means that high level properties, though being in some way dependent on low 
level properties, in the sense that the latter are required for the instantiation of the 
former, are not reducible to them. It is as if, once appeared, high level properties ac-
quire a fully autonomous status. As O’Connor & Wong (2015) put it, «emergent en-
tities (properties or substances) “arise” out of more fundamental entities and yet are 
“novel” or “irreducible” with respect to them». Most important, emergent properties 
can play a causal role, even towards low-level properties; this is usually expressed 
by saying that emergentism is committed to downward 
causation. 2
E1 is clearly a metaphysical claim. Therefore, 
in order to make our first comparison with RECS, we 
need an epistemological counterpart of E1; in oth-
er words, we have to find an epistemological defini-
tion that fits E1 reasonably well. A good starting point 
for this purpose is the irreducibility of emergent properties, whose epistemological 
counterpart is the claim that high level properties cannot be either predicted or de-
duced from low level properties (though “arising”, in some sense, out of them). This 
has the defect of being a negative claim. Yet, even if we do not have a clear answer to 
2 It is worth to note, however, that 
downward causation is not neces-
sarily part of the emergentist view. 
Alexander (1920), for instance, did 
not believe in downward causation, 
though believing in the genuinely 
new status of emergent properties. 
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the question of how high level properties can be accounted for, we are able to give a 
partly positive sketchy claim:
E2) Emergent properties (and laws) are systemic features of complex systems 
which cannot be predicted or accounted for by the laws governing its parts.
This suggests that the behavior of complex organisms is determined by emergent 
properties. The behavior of complex systems is standardly nonlinear, meaning that (i) 
the system may respond in different ways to the same input depending on its state 
or context, and (ii) a change in the size of the input does not produce a proportional 
change in the size of the output. For this reason, the behavior of complex systems has 
to be described by non-linear dynamical models. And here we found the touch point 
with RECS: dynamicism. So there is room to compare RECS and emergentism, both 
taken as epistemological claims.  
II.1. Comparing the epistemological claims
There are two (related) reasons for thinking that RECS is a form of epistemological 
emergentism: 
1. The mathematical models usually employed to describe the behavior of 
systems characterized by emergent properties are non-linear dynamical 
systems.
2. RECS’ explanatory model is not mechanistic: it is impossible to reconstruct 
in a componential way the behavior of the system from the behavior of its 
parts. 
As to 1, there is not much to add. Non-linearity is the mathematical counterpart of 
the impossibility to predict the behavior of the system. Physical complex systems are 
non-linear. 
As to 2, even if we assume (at least for the sake of argument) that the mind 
of an agent can be decomposed in a collection of parts or subsystems, the work-
ing of each part is not independent from the working of the other parts: the rela-
tion between subsystems is not linear (or, equivalently, subsystems are not modules). 
Therefore, the behavior of the whole system cannot be linearly obtained from the 
behavior of its parts. We could say that what is common to RECS and to emergen-
tist explanatory models is a kind of holism. It is the methodological principle that the 
whole is more than the “sum” of its parts. As Chemero put it, «in dynamical explana-
tions, the behavior of a system is typically explained in terms of collective variables 
(...). A collective variable describes the emergent, coordinated activity of the parts 
that compose a dynamical system, and in some cases this collective variable is caus-
ally responsible for the component parts» (2009,199). 
The best way to understand what is a collective variable is giving an ex-
ample. A very oft-cited example is finger wagging (and limbs movement in general). 
In finger wagging the relative phase is a collective variable whose state determines 
the behavior of the system. A collective variable is a variable whose values are deter-
mined by a relation between the values of other variables, i.e. the variables that de-
scribe the movements of each finger. Usually, collective variables refer neither to in-
ternal aspects of the agent, nor to external aspects: «Relative phase, in other words, is 
a higher-level entity, which is composed of lower-level entities, but also controls the 
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behavior of those very same lower-level entities. This sort of explanation implies that 
the lower level is not causally complete, but is subject to constraint from the high-
er-level collective variable» (2009, 216). 
Therefore, there are good reasons to conclude that RECS’ favorite explana-
tory tool or model is non-linear dynamical systems theory, and for a substantive rea-
son: mind is a paradigm case of a complex system, whose behavior and properties are 
emergent. In this sense we can found more than an epistemological analogy between 
RECS and emergentism: there are similar epistemological assumptions at their base. 
Note, moreover, that finger wagging is a case of downward causation, since 
the relative phase is a causally efficacious emergent property. This might suggest a 
metaphysical interpretation of dynamicism as a kind of emergentism. In the next 
subsection we turn to analyse the perspectives for a metaphysical analogy.
II.2. Comparing the metaphysical claims
From a metaphysical point of view, emergentism is prima facie a kind of properties 
dualism such that high level properties are causally efficacious, having effects on low 
level properties. Is it possible to give a metaphysical reading of dynamicism, based on 
its apparent commitment to causally efficacious high level properties, such as relative 
phase in finger wagging? If this were the case, RECS would be committed to emer-
gentism even from a metaphysical point of view, to the extent that there is down-
ward causation and (arguably) properties dualism both in RECS and emergentism. 
However, as we shall see, RECS’ metaphysical commitments are somewhat unclear. 
An argument to the effect that RECS is a form of metaphysical emer-
gentism could be developed along the following lines. On RECS’ view collective varia-
bles are crucial explanatory properties; and collective variables are high level proper-
ties that control the behavior of low level entities. This entails that the lower level is 
not causally complete; quite the contrary, the lower level is constrained by the high 
level collective variables. But then –as Chemero argues– RECS provides a solution to 
the mind-body problem, because the causal closure of the physical world is defeated. 
Indeed, the mind-body problem arises by the tension between the causal closure of 
physics and the causal efficacy of the mental qua mental; giving up the causal closure 
is usually considered as an emergentist solution to the mind-body problem. 
To sum up:
• Collective variables are high level emergent properties, not predictable from 
low level properties; 
• Collective variables have causal powers, involving downward causation. 
Hence the physical world is not causally closed. 
Therefore, RECS is committed to an emergentist solution of the mind-body problem; 
in the light of this, it seems as if RECS is a form of emergentism across the board, 
both epistemological and metaphysical. However, this conclusion faces at least three 
problems: 
1. The thesis that mental properties are collective variables is unclear. 
2. RECS seems not to be committed to multi-level explanations, which are 
more “at home” with mechanistic/computational explanations. 
3. The emergentist interpretation of RECS’ metaphysics is in conflict with 
other assumptions of the theory. 
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Let me expand each point a little. 
As to 1, finger wagging is hardly, if anything, a mental task. For sure, it is 
not a prototypical one. Indeed, assessing the ratio of phases as a mental property is 
almost unintelligible, since there is no relation at all between common-sense mental 
states and collective variables.  3 Also, what is the rela-
tion between collective variables and neural patterns is 
left unspecified. One is free to approach psychology us-
ing a physico-mathematical apparatus, but then he can 
hardly escape the consequence of being considered as 
an eliminativist about mental states and a behaviorist in psychology (cf. infra). Until 
the explanatory model based on dynamical systems theory is confined to highly au-
tomatic physical behaviors (such as finger wagging), it will hardly be accepted as an 
explanation of how the mind works. 
As to 2, RECS seems to be committed, at least in certain versions, to a sin-
gle-level explanatory model, the agent-environment level. This is particularly mani-
fest in the case of ecological psychology, which Chemero regards as a pillar of RECS. 
Therefore, it is unclear whether the distinction high level vs. low level makes sense in 
this context.
As to 3, the pragmatic view of cognition and the related rejection of rep-
resentations seem to be at home with behaviorism. However, behaviorism is more a 
rejection of metaphysics than a metaphysical view of the mind. It is arguably a sort 
of eliminativism of mental properties. In the light of this, emergentism seems to be 
quite different from eliminativism. 
In the light of these difficulties, we would better take into consideration 
what is explicitly said by RECS’ supporters on the issue at stake, rather than speculat-
ing on alleged metaphysical interpretations of dynamicism.
In the first chapter of Radical Embodied Cognitive Science (Chemero 2009), 
the author claims that the metaphysical view closest to RECS is Gibson’s ecological 
psychology, described as a «unifying background theory», and classifies ecological 
psychology as a variety of eliminativism. Indeed, to the extent that RECS gives up 
representations across the board, it can be regarded as an eliminativist account of 
mental states. This clashes with the emergentist interpretation of RECS, at least as 
far as the mind/body problem is concerned. If mental states do not exist, they are not 
emergent either. 
However, according to Chemero there is another metaphysical view that can 
be associated to RECS: phenomenological realism. What is phenomenological realism? 
It is a position concerning the relation between the mind and the world op-
posed to metaphysical realism. As Chemero put it, 
If the animal and the environment —the thinking and the thought about, the perception and 
perceived— are taken to be an inseparable unity, one cannot first try to understand what the 
world is like and then, given that, work on how animals know about it. These questions must 
be understood simultaneously, or, worse from the point of view of realism, by beginning with 
understanding the nature of the cognitive system (2009, 183-184).
As far as I can tell, here Chemero is tentatively supposing that RECS is committed to 
a sort of neutral monism: reality is experience. This has an anti-realist (somewhat 
Kantian) flavor, to the extent that it is claimed that the world is a joint construction 
made by agents and the environment. Gallagher would agree (see e.g. supra, §1, his 
second claim constitutive of enactivism). «Although we may be justified in believing 
3 Friends of RECS could  
intend their use of the term 
“mental” as revisionary. 
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that there is an animal-independent external world, we have no justification to be-
lieve that our perceptions, thoughts, and theories are accurate reflections of it» (2009, 
188). In a slightly different (and arguably more Kantian) way, what we take to be the 
real world is rather just our environment. But it is environment that matters.  
Clearly, phenomenological realism per se has little to do with the mind-
body issue. However, since mental states are conceived of as the result of the con-
struction out of organismic abilities and the world, mind-body supervenience is out 
of question. In this perspective the following claim by Chemero is enlightening: «the 
problem of qualia does not arise in radical embodied cognitive science» (2009, 197). 
If we understand why the problem does not arise, then, probably, we will be able to 
answer the central question of this paper. 
According to Chemero the problem does not arise in RECS because the 
problem is a consequence of (computational) functionalism, which defines qualia 
as what remains once one has subtracted functional properties: «There is a widely 
shared intuition that understanding meaningful cognition as computation leaves 
the experience out» (Chemero 2009, 198). Hence phenomenological realism en-
tails that «conscious experiences are genuinely existing aspects of animal–envi-
ronment systems».
To sum up, there is no a single metaphysical claim concerning the mind in 
RECS. There are at least two, one concerning the relation between mind and brain, the 
other concerning the relation between mind and world. In both cases, however, there 
seems to be, though very roughly, a commitment to a sophisticated variety of elim-
inativism, insofar as the common sense view on mental states is rejected. Perhaps 
the most correct way of framing the metaphysics of RECS’ is to say that the clas-
sical metaphysical models of the mind (such as supervenience, identity, etc.) are all 
wrong, and in order to make sense of the mind we need to free ourselves from that 
way of thinking. In both cases, assimilating RECS to emergentism (from a metaphys-
ical point of view) seems to be hazardous at the very least.   
Interestingly, Gallagher (2017) has a slightly 
different view on this point, stemming from the holis-
tic conception intrinsic to dynamicism. 4 Gallagher sees 
a problem in holism, namely, the difficulty of taking into 
consideration all the relevant factors in an experimen-
tally controlled scientific investigation; or, as he put it, 
the difficulty to operationalize holism. A good example of this is the “clunky robot 
problem”. This is the problem of putting together the different modules that, taken 
together, constitute the control structure of a robot. Even though each module, taken 
in itself, performs correctly its function, there is no warranty that, when the modules 
are integrated, the robot works, showing the expected behavior. Indeed, this difficul-
ty is exactly what we should expect when the dynamicist view is endorsed: it is only 
in modular systems that interconnections between modules do not arise problems.    
As Gallagher points out, 
The same problem can be found in theory construction. Scientific experiments, designed with-
in the framework of their own particular paradigm, often study the pieces of a system but 
don’t always consider how the dynamical relations among those pieces work, and don’t always 
have the vocabulary to address those relations. Even working in an interdisciplinary way we 
often find ourselves building a clunky theory where insights from different disciplines don’t 
integrate well (2017, 22).
4 «Enactivists, by focusing […] 
on the rich dynamics of brain–
body–environment, offer a 
holistic conception of cogni-
tion» (Gallagher 2017, 21).
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Therefore, although enactivism makes empirical claims, holism presents problems for 
empirical investigations. Gallagher’s suggestion to cope with this problem is a view of 
enactivism as a very general framework: a “philosophy of nature”, which «takes se-
riously the results of science, and its claims remain consistent with them, but it can 
reframe those results to integrate them with results from many sciences» (2017, 22). 
Enactivism is a philosophy of nature because it offers, rather than a peculiar view of 
the mind, a peculiar view of the nature as a whole (“a rethinking of the concept of 
nature itself”).
Now, it is unclear to me to what extent this makes a difference (with re-
spect to Chemero’s position) for the issue discussed in this paper. Does a philosophy 
of nature involve a certain, well specified, metaphysical view of the mind? Or, is a phi-
losophy of nature compatible with several different views, imposing merely some 
modest constraints on what the mind could be? Be that as it may, this discussion con-
cerning the problems raised by holism for scientific investigation is essentially episte-
mological. As before, if we want to understand what the metaphysical view of mind 
endorsed by enactivism amounts to, we should better look for the explicit claims (if 
there are) made by the authors, in this case, Gallagher. He rejects the charge of being 
a behaviorist; at the same time, however, he urges a re-thinking of what the behavio-
rism is, as a consequence of a re-thinking of what behavior is. References to Merleau-
Ponty suggest that there are strong similarities between the enactivist view of the 
mind and what Chemero calls ‘phenomenological realism’. Therefore, again, the as-
similation to (metaphysical) emergentism does not work. The issue would deserve a 
much longer discussion, but the core point is the following: emergentism, from the 
enactivist perspective, is still a view of the mind committed to the traditional distinc-
tion between mental properties and physical properties. By contrast, enactivists aim 
to sketch a different view in which the classical distinction does not make sense. The 
dynamical relations between brain, body and environment are not mental anymore 
than they are physical.
III. Conclusions
RECS’ explanatory model is a version of epistemological emergentism, at least in the 
sense that the linguistic and modeling tools used in RECS are appropriate for describ-
ing emergent phenomena. It is much more difficult to establish analogies between 
RECS and metaphysical emergentism. One reason of this difficulty is that RECS tends 
to reject the multilayers picture involving the distinction between high level and low 
level properties. Moreover, and most important, RECS’s crypto-behaviorism is more 
at home with an eliminativist view of the mind. 
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to understand what exactly are mental 
processes in RECS picture. On the one hand, the insistence on embodiment seems to 
entail a monist view in which what we are inclined to call “mental aspects” are actu-
ally bodily aspects (even if not in a systematic and coherent way). On the other hand, 
the terms ‘mind’ and ‘mental’ are often used as referring to dynamical relations be-
tween the brain, the body and the environment. 
I would say, in the end, that the position on the mind-body problem closest 
to RECS is a peculiar version of eliminativism. Indeed, Chemero explicitly characteriz-
es eliminativism as a legacy of American pragmatism (see 2009, chap. 1). The pecu-
liarity consists in the fact that eliminativism typically goes hand in hand with phys-
icalism, whereas RECS takes physicalism just as a description among the others of 
the world. On RECS’ view, the furniture of the world seems not to be simply physical. 
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Therefore, RECS, in spite of the epistemological analogies, is not a version of 
(metaphysical) emergentism, and is not committed to the main assumptions under-
lying the idea of emergent mind.
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